Post

Dropper

Dropper

Executive Summary

The dropper file exhibits malicious behavior by executing commands via cmd.exe, using a ping delay to time operations, and deploying a payload in a hidden manner. It connects to suspicious domains and downloads resources, likely for further infection or data theft. Additionally, it incorporates self-deletion to erase traces after execution.


Case Details

Sample Information

AttributeValue
File Namedropper.bin
File Size12 KB
File TypeExecutable (EXE)
MD51d8562c0adcaee734d63f7baaca02f7c
SHA1be138820e72435043b065fbf3a786be274b147ab
SHA25692730427321a1c4ccfc0d0580834daef98121efa9bb8963da332bfd6cf1fda8a
Compile-timeSat Sep 04 18:11:12 2021 (UTC)

Case-Specific Requirements

Environment

  • Operating System: Windows

Tools Used

  • Floss
  • PEStudio
  • IDA
  • ProcMon
  • CMDWatcher
  • x32dbg
  • FakeNet
  • APIMonitor
  • APILogger

Static Analysis

We used PEStudio to check the compile stamp, revealing it was compiled on Sat Sep 04 18:11:12 2021 (UTC).

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60/72 antivirus vendors flagged the program as malicious, including Kaspersky. The filename of the debug is listed in the Indicators section.

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Next, using Floss, we read any strings found in the malware sample.

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Multiple commands were found in the strings of the sample.

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We checked the libraries that could be used.

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On IDA, we observed the following:

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The program exhibits malicious behavior by downloading a file:
CR433101[.]dat[.]exe

The downloaded file came from this URL:
hxxp[://]ssl-6582datamanager[.]helpdeskbros[.]local/favicon[.]ico

The file was saved in the public directory:
C:\Users\Public\Documents

The malware uses cmd.exe to execute the file with a delay:
ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 3000

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The malware performs self-deletion to remove traces of the executable. If the download fails, it connects to another URL:
hxxp[://]huskyhacks[.]dev

It attempts to execute the file via ShellExecuteW. These actions highlight the malware’s function as a dropper for delivering and executing payloads.


Dynamic Analysis

Because PEStudio detected two libraries that load potentially malicious content, we opened ProcMon and filtered WININET.dll and urlmon.dll.

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We checked additional actions performed by the file:

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An alternative method to monitor commands was to use CMDWatcher, which shows all commands executed by dropper.exe.

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We loaded x32dbg to view additional strings in memory and found URLs inside dropper.exe.

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Using FakeNet, we monitored traffic and found similar domains while performing static analysis, such as husky[.]dev.

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Lastly, we checked for the APIs used by the dropper. Using APIMonitor, we observed URLDownloadToFileW:

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We also checked with ApiLogger:

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Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

IOCType
C:\Users\Matt\source\repos\HuskyHacks\PMAT-maldev\src\DownloadFromURL\Release\DownloadFromURL.pdbPath
hxxp[://]huskyhacks[.]devURL
C:\Users\Public\Documents\CR433101.dat.exePath
hxxp[://]ssl-6582datamanager[.]helpdeskbros[.]local/favicon[.]icoURL

Additional Notes

5.7 Additional Notes

  • MD5 hash of the malware:
    • 1d8562c0adcaee734d63f7baaca02f7c
  • Sample submitted to VirusTotal and detection name assigned by Kaspersky Anti-Virus engine:
    • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.SelfDel.gen
  • Domain name found in the malware sample:
    • huskyhacks[.]dev
  • Compilation timestamp of the malware sample in UTC time:
    • 2021-09-04 18:11:12 UTC
  • Number of sections in the PE malware:
    • 5
  • Library filename flagged as suspicious by PE Studio:
    • urlmon.dll
  • Windows API flagged by PE Studio that could potentially be used to execute a second-stage malware:
    • ShellExecuteW
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